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Aspects of Economic Governance in the Euro Area: 
Restoring Internal and External Balances 
 
Nicos Christodoulakis1 
 
Abstract: The Economic Governance for the Euro Area is envisaged to be both an overseeing 
framework that enables the timely identification of oncoming trouble, as well as a correction 
mechanism that puts an economy hit by major shocks back in order. The paper discusses the 
relevance of prevention and correction mechanisms, and finds that exclusively focusing fiscal 
policy on debt sustainability may be misleading for all and more harmful to the weaker economies 
in particular, unless internal and external imbalances are taken into account. The fiscal rule should 
be designed so as to be compatible with debt sustainability in the medium run but also allowed to 
respond to short term output and current account fluctuations. The micro-management of fiscal 
components with regards to political feasibility and social equity is also discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
The Economic Governance (EG) for the European Union (EU) is envisaged to be 
both an overseeing framework that enables the timely identification of oncoming 
trouble, as well as a correction mechanism that puts an economy hit by major shocks 
back in order. Though the framework covers the whole of EU, the debate is 
particularly intense within the Euro Area and the reason is that the global financial 
crisis of 2008 and the subsequent debt crises in 2010 have had far more dramatic 
consequences for its economies, especially after some of them asked for extensive 
rescue programs and the rest had to bail them out. Since both crises escaped the early 
detection of European surveillance, it is natural to expect that the new framework 
would primarily enable both debtor and creditor nations of the Euro Area to avoid 
similar adversities in the future. This has led several to see the current debate simply 
as a wiser-after-the-event reaction to the crises, but fair is to say that the roots of the 
subject go back at the inauguration of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) or 
even before; a summary of the main steps in improving fiscal surveillance in the 
European Union during 1994-2008 can be found in Noord et al (2008, Table 1).  
The reason for the early acknowledgement of the issue was no other than the famous 
‘incompleteness’ of EMU, in the sense that the full integration of monetary policy 
through the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) was not matched by a 
similar institution of fiscal union as that envisaged by Mundell (1961) for a currency 
area to be viable and optimal. A politically feasible substitute amounted to the 
enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) plus a number of overseeing 
and consultation processes between EU authorities and national Governments which 
were constantly debated and improved ever since.  
As noted by Noord et al (2008) these improvements resulted in a better fiscal position 
for the overall EU: for example, in 2006 the debt ratio came back on a declining 
trend, while in 2007 the aggregate EU government deficit was at the lowest level for 
more than thirty years. Even fiscally-hawkish institutions, like the IMF, were 
positively assessing the early period of EMU decision-making and did not feel 
obliged to suggest a further centralization of fiscal policy. For example, Annett et al 
(2005) saw no case for major changes to Europe’s fiscal rules and advised that the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) focus more on policies rather than outcomes, 
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while staying operationally simple and transparent. But then the financial and debt 
crises hit the Eurozone and made all the early complacency to melt in the air. 
The aim of the new framework is not to marginalize its precursors, such as the SGP, 
but rather to enrich them by introducing more concrete and effective ways of 
enforcing them in practice.  The proposals that have been put forward include a 
continuous monitoring and evaluation of economic imbalances of member states, 
both domestic and external ones. After several intermediate steps have been taken 
over the recent years (including financial mechanisms, the Fiscal Compact, and 
monitoring procedures), the main  pillars of the new framework were crystallized in 
the so-called ‘Five Presidents’ Report (FPR) by Juncker et al (2015) and include the 
following: 
One set of proposals concerns fiscal management in member-states so as to enhance 
credibility, transparency and efficiency in applying the rules of SGP. The national 
institutions entitled with the implementation of fiscal policy are going to be 
supervised by an independent Fiscal Council, while the implementation mechanism 
will rely on an Automatic Fiscal Stabilizer within the fiscal jurisdiction of the 
country concerned. In case that a national budget is overwhelmed by a severe crisis, 
the possibility of union-wide Treasury is tentatively discussed, though its creation 
and function are left for the longer term. 
Another set includes the monitoring of external balances of member-states in 
conjunction with developments in unit labour costs and competitiveness. As with the 
fiscal front, a National Productivity Council is envisaged to gauge developments and 
lay out the appropriate reforms through the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure 
(MIP). In addition, the European Fund for Strategic Investments is expected to 
support growth efforts by member states, while the Banking Union will be completed 
by a European Deposit Insurance Scheme that provides stability in the financial 
sector and thwarts contagion effects from fiscal imbalances to the banking sector and 
vice versa.  
 
After the publication of FPR, a number of academic and policy studies dealt with 
many aspects of the new framework. Fully covering the literature is beyond the aim 
of the present article but a concise description of Economic Governance can be found 
in, for example, De Streel (2013) and also in Delivorias (2015). The present paper 
4 
 
focuses on a few questions with regards to the applicability and effectiveness of EG 
as described below: 
 
First issue is whether EG predominantly concentrates on budgetary targets and fiscal 
management or should embrace a wider set of economic indicators. Recently, an 
official report by the European Commission2 stated that Economic Governance 
‘aims to detect, prevent, and correct problematic economic trends such as excessive 
government deficits or public debt levels, which can stunt growth and put economies 
at risk”. The priority that is given to the budgetary situation will inevitably result to 
stringent fiscal management and intertemporal adjustment programs in order to 
strengthen credibility and achieve debt sustainability in the medium run.  
Additionally, concern is expressed on external imbalances either between member-
states or with regards to the rest of the world. There exist a number of proposals on 
how competitiveness is monitored, but they are yet to be seen how effective they will 
be in avoiding over-accumulation of external surpluses. The fact that budgetary 
targets are specifically set, as opposed to the vagueness of facing external 
asymmetries, may lead  to a contractionary bias in fiscal management that will not 
be helpful in enhancing growth or reduce imbalances in the monetary union. 
Whatever the causes that led a budgetary indicator to derail in a specific country, a 
correction through prolonged fiscal contraction may totally miss the point if its 
economy is, at the same time, hit by deep recession. A ‘positive-feedback’ situation 
may occur if public surpluses are raised to reduce indebtedness but – thanks to 
Keynesian multipliers - activity slows down to a greater extent, thus making the debt-
to-GDP ratio to rise further and new measures to be needed perpetuating the crisis. 
The experience of such ‘doom-loop’ austerity policies in the European periphery 
since 2010 is too recent to be ignored; for a discussion see De Grauwe and Ji (2013), 
and Christodoulakis (2014) among many others. Even under less extreme 
circumstances, Fitoussi and Saraceno (2012) warn that if too much emphasis is given 
                                                          
2 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/index_en.htm 
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in achieving intermediate targets of macroeconomic stability it risks ignoring the 
pursuit of the ultimate objectives of growth and full employment.   
Second issue is whether policy actions should (or even be allowed to) be symmetric 
with regards to the direction of deviations from targets. Why, for example, a country 
that pursues competitive policies that result to external and/or budgetary surpluses, 
instead of being hailed as champions, must be penalized in a similar way with a 
member-state which, by neglecting such policies, suffers from current account 
and/or fiscal deficits? The implication of this argument is that only deficit-ridden 
economies should have to be corrected without expecting any burden sharing by 
those in surplus, not even in the form of an expansion that would mitigate their own 
cost of adjustment. In a regime of fully-fledged fiscal federalism, burden sharing 
would be much easier to be handled collectively but, as noted by Catania (2011), this 
entails some transfer of sovereignty and is currently beyond any realistic 
consideration. For the time-being, Verhelst (2011) argues that the existing Treaty 
provides that a member state is solely responsible for its debt, thus commitments on 
undertaking support of other members cannot be assumed, nor are they allowed to 
explicitly share the debt burden of others.  
Despite such formal clarity of the Treaty, the recent experience of bail-out programs 
suggests that if crisis spillovers hit the Euro Area as a whole, it is preferable that 
emergency collective action is undertaken by all members of the union rather than 
let everyone face the consequences alone. Another reason of burden sharing is that, 
sometimes, the origins of a crisis in the public finances of a particular country may 
lie outside the public sphere or even the country itself.  
The notable example is the banking sector. An informative report prepared by the 
House of Lords (2011) on the roots of the crisis and the future of Economic 
Governance in the EU, notes that ‘one of the principal elements that contributed to 
the current crisis’ was the ‘interconnection of the sovereign debt and banking 
sectors’, (my emphasis).  Accordingly, the report suggests that ‘[m]echanisms must 
be put in place to control the behavior of banks and to ensure that the public sector 
does not end up carrying the cost of failing banks’. In such cases, burden sharing 
should involve other sectors of the economy and other countries as well, otherwise 
fiscal correction will unduly suppress economic activity in the particular country. 
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A final issue concerns the applicability of Economic Governance and which 
member-states are obliged to implement it. As the framework mainly aims at 
averting another debt-crisis in the Euro Area, the non-Euro countries will probably 
oppose the uniformity of stringent fiscal rules that might be irrelevant for their 
priorities or even hinder growth and employment. In fact, little progress toward more 
economic governability was achieved even during the smoother pre-crisis period: De 
Areilza (2013) notes, for example, that member-states strongly resisted the 
implementation of Lisbon Strategy though it was mostly a consensual growth-
agenda rather than a despicable recipe of fiscal contraction. More recently, there has 
been a clear differentiation between Euro Area and non-Euro economies in the 
attempt to qualm the fears that EG would entail surrendering UK’s economic 
sovereignty to Brussels.3 In the aftermath of Brexit, it is likely that the remaining 
non-Euro economies would rather distance themselves even more from the 
provisions of EG. Hence, it is perhaps more productive to concentrate on how 
Economic Governance is primarily applied to the Euro Area economies. If the 
implementation is successful, it will then create an ambitious benchmark that none 
of the non-Euro economies will be able to ignore.  
 In view of the above, the present paper focuses on Economic Governance in the 
Euro Area (EGEA for short). After discussing the relevance of prevention and 
correction mechanisms for the weaker economies that were engulfed in the 2010 
crisis, it finds that letting fiscal policy to exclusively focus on debt sustainability may 
turn out to be overly expansionary in good times or insufficiently active in bad times. 
To avoid the costs of inflationary or deflationary pressures respectively, it suggests 
that fiscal management incorporates targets for internal and external balances. To 
this purpose, the fiscal rule should be designed so as to be compatible with debt 
sustainability in the medium run but also allowed to respond to short term output 
fluctuations and current account imbalances.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the macroeconomic 
indicators that are likely to be used as warnings for oncoming troubles in the 
economy and examines their usefulness in detecting the 2010 crisis. Section 3 
examines how current account deficits were dealt with in the bail-out programs, 
                                                          
3 In February 2016, then UK Prime Minister Cameron got an important concession that EU is differentiated 
from the Euro Area so that economic governance rulings for the common currency do not affect pound 
sterling; see https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-on-europe 
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while Section 4 argues that policy action should be undertaken to correct both deficit 
and surplus deviations. Section 5 proposes that fiscal policy should address 
sustainability in the medium term but must be also tuned to fight off deviations from 
internal and external balance in the short term. Section 6 discusses how the various 
components of fiscal policy have to be combined so as to increase efficiency and 
equity, and finally Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Looking for trouble? The limitations of fiscal indicators 
A crucial choice in the design and implementation of EGEA is the set of indicators 
that are going to be monitored in the hope that they provide an early alertness against 
oncoming trouble. As they currently stand, the provisions of EG focus specifically 
on the size and sustainability of public debt so that the limit 60% of GDP becomes 
truly operational in the future as opposed to the vague attention it has received in the 
past; see (EC, 2015, p3). In the same spirit, a recent IMF paper deals with the 
operational aspects of EG and proposes that “[a]s a stock variable, the public debt-
to-GDP ratio is considered a natural anchor for capturing repeated (cumulative) 
fiscal slippages that flow variables, like the budget deficit, would not capture”; see 
Andrle et al (2014).  
Though the above suggestions look inevitable after the experience of exploding debt 
episodes in the Euro Area, they may not necessarily represent the key issues that 
have to be addressed in a crisis. This may happen because a future crisis may not 
necessarily stem from the same sources and imbalances. Moreover, debt and 
budgetary indicators proved to be quite misleading even with regards to the 2010 
crisis as discussed below.  
By now it has become common wisdom that the crises that took place in Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus between 2010 and 2015 were not mainly due to 
the stock of debt per se but to the lack of liquidity brought about by the international 
credit shortage that made large external imbalances impossible to be financed any 
more. In this line, Krugman (2011) explained that the crisis in the southern Euro area 
countries was triggered by the sudden stoppage of capital inflows that were required 
to finance their huge external deficits rather than through cumulative imbalances of 
the past. More specifically, Barrios et al (2009) note that the explosion of sovereign 
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spreads that sparked the crises of the European periphery occurred in countries with 
large external deficits even if their fiscal position looked healthy.  
To further illustrate the point, it is logical to assume that a minimum requirement of 
a prevention framework is that it must be found appropriate in foretelling the Euro 
Area crisis if applied retro-actively. A simple demonstration is presented below by 
looking at three sets of indicators over the pre-crisis period 2006-2008: 
Fig. 1 shows the average of public debt to GDP in the years preceding the crisis for 
the 12-member Euro Area. Of the bailed-out countries, only Greece would have been 
spotted for trouble, while Portugal, Spain and Ireland seemed to be safely away from 
the hazardous zone. The alarms would have rather sounded for Italy and Belgium, 
though subsequently none of them experienced a fiscal pressure big enough to be 
unable to control. As noted by Belke (2011), such an alarm would have “misse[d] 
the point because the fundamentals of Spain and Italy, especially in their self-
financing capacities, appear[ed] much stronger than those of, for instance, Greece, 
and Portugal”. The irony was that although the dramatic events were dubbed as a 
‘debt crisis’, public indebtedness was in fact seriously deteriorated by the front-
loaded austerity programs applied in these countries.4 
 
Fig. 1. Debt to GDP ratios, prior to the debt crisis 
                                                          
4 As opposed to the debt levels shown in Fig. 1, in 2015 Greece had a debt-to-GDP ratio of 177%, Ireland 
79%, Portugal 128%, Spain 101% and Cyprus 107%; figures from AMECO database.  
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Note: Red bars indicate the bailed-out countries. Source: Ameco Database 
 
 
Fig. 2 shows the average of General Government balances as a percentage of GDP 
prior to the crisis. Again, only Greece is found to be in the spotlight. Portugal had a 
deficit marginally smaller than the SGP threshold of 3%, while Spain and Ireland 
looked to be fiscally healthy economies with no sign pointing to the oncoming 
pressures. Begg (2011) states that at that time ‘the Irish and Spanish economies were 
poster boys of the euro area [and] nothing in their budgetary indicators predicted … 
the surge of debt’.  In fact, the overall position of the Euro Area but Greece seemed 
to be fiscally robust rather than in peril. 
 
Fig. 2. General Government deficits as percent of GDP, prior to the debt crisis 
Note: Red bars indicate the bailed-out countries. Source: Ameco Database 
Finally, Fig. 3 shows the average of external deficits over the same pre-crisis period. 
Now, all of the bailed-out countries are found to be the most vulnerable among the 
Euro Area economies.5 At the time of the crisis, this was perhaps a big surprise for 
a union where external imbalances were thought of never being able to threaten its 
                                                          
5 Similar conclusions apply for Cyprus, where the current account deficit was -10.9% of GDP in average 
during 2006-2008. Again, budgetary indicators looked healthy indeed:  public debt was 52% of GDP, 
while General Government balance was at a surplus +1.03% of GDP. 
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coherence since the common currency had ruled out hostile devaluations. It took a 
painful realization for the Euro Area to admit that ruling out a traditional response 
to an old problem is one thing, while dealing with the problem itself remains quite 
another.  
 
Fig. 3. Current Account balances deficits as percent of GDP, prior to the debt crisis 
Note: Red bars indicate the bailed-out countries. Source: Ameco Database 
Summing-up, one can easily see that, with the exception of Greece, the use of public 
debt and deficits would have very little usefulness in the prognostication of the crisis 
that hit the Eurozone in 2010. Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus and Spain would have passed 
unnoticed as none of them was posing any serious budgetary problem at that time. 
Even for debt-ridden Greece, it seems that the crisis accelerated due to confusion over 
its true character: according to Feldstein (2012), ‘what started as a concern about a 
Greek liquidity problem – in other words, about the ability of Greece to have the cash 
to meet its next interest payments – became a solvency problem, a fear that Greece 
would never be able to repay its existing and accumulating debt’, (my emphases).  
 
The retroactive inspection shows the limitations of using only fiscal indicators as 
warning signals for an oncoming crisis in the Euro Area. In contrast, paying attention 
to the external imbalances could have provided policy-makers with much sounder 
warnings on the nature and severity of oncoming trouble. 
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3. Addressing the External Balance 
 
Gauging adverse developments in the external position and design appropriate policy 
actions was never central in the agenda of EU policy-making either before or after 
the creation of the EMU. As noted by Christodoulakis and Sarantides (2016), the 
issue was never formally considered as an explicit target in the EMU Treaty, 
probably because it was difficult to imagine that external imbalances would diverge 
so dramatically after the launch of common currency. The EMU project was in fact 
based on the optimistic assumption that - as a result of the monetary unification - 
increased factor mobility would foster growth and competitiveness across countries, 
to an extent enough to redress any serious imbalances emerging in their current 
accounts.  
To correct the omission this time, the Economic Governance framework now 
includes the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) as a surveillance 
mechanism for detecting serious deviations that may threaten the functioning of the 
Euro Area. Regarding the external sector, imbalances are seen as critical if the 
current account is in a deficit larger than -4% of GDP or in a surplus above 6% of 
GDP on a three-year average; see EC (2012, p4). To monitor developments in 
competitiveness and devise appropriate policy actions, the Ecofin has already 
suggested the creation of the National Productivity Council (NPC) in each country.6  
The key factor to be considered seems to be the unit labour cost (ULC) on the 
assumption that it is the main determinant of competitiveness in world markets; see 
EC (2012, p 14). Therefore policy recommendations will likely focus on the 
implementation of an ‘internal devaluation’ process that includes wage-setting 
agreements and labour market flexibility as the quick antidote to the deterioration of 
                                                          
6 http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10083-2016-INIT/en/pdf 
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competitiveness. For countries with external surpluses a correction mechanism is not 
yet specified.7 
Hence, it is interesting to see whether and how external deficits were indeed 
corrected in the bail-out countries after such policies were implemented. Fig. 4 
shows that improvements in the ULC-based productivity index are moderately 
correlated with the reduction of labour costs in Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain, 
thus the effect of internal devaluation is only partially corroborated by evidence.  
 
 
Fig.4. Correlation of net exports and ULC-based competitiveness  
Note: Countries include Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal over the period 2009-2015.  ULC stands 
for the harmonized competitiveness indicator based on Unit Labour Cost for the total economy, 
(1999q1=100). Annual average. Source: Ameco Database; ULC competitiveness from ECB. 
 
Another factor for improving trade imbalances in those countries was the 
implementation of austerity measures that helped to contain aggregate demand and 
imports. Taking primary public surpluses as a measure of austerity applied in those 
countries, Fig. 5 shows a similar moderate correlation with net exports. 
 
                                                          
7 As noted by Breuss (2013), the present framework leaves surplus Germany without sanctions. Whether 
it turned out to be so accidentally or by design is not investigated. 
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Fig.5. Correlation of net exports and public primary balances 
Note: Countries include Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal over the period 2009-2015.  
GG stands for General Government. Source: Ameco Database 
 
In some cases the austerity effect was, in fact, much stronger than that of 
competitiveness, and the experience of Greece is quite didactic on this matter. The 
implementation of austerity measures brought the external deficit from an alarming 
level of around -15% of GDP in 2008 to an almost balance in 2015, but the correction 
was by cutting imports not raising exports. Despite wage cuts that were implemented 
as part of the internal devaluation and led to an improvement of ULC-based 
productivity by 24%, the level of exports has hardly improved, as clearly 
demonstrated in  Fig. 6.  
The above examination suggests that ULC or austerity policies have only partial 
effects on containing external imbalances and must be used with prudence and in 
conjunction with the overall economic situation so as not to exacerbate austerity in 
case of a downturn. Moreover, an integral approach to external imbalances should 
focus on attracting investment and introducing appropriate reforms in deficit 
countries. Christodoulakis and Axioglou (2016) show that most of the Euro Area 
economies suffer from extensive underinvestment after the global crisis and the need 
to undertake EU-wide initiatives to restore investment activity is more urgent than 
ever. 
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Fig.6. Exports (Lhs) and competitiveness (Rhs) in Greece, 2000-2015. 
Note: Exports in Euro millions. ULC index is defined as in Fig. 4 and referred  
to the right-hand scale. Source: Bank of Greece and ECB  
 
Reform initiatives are also crucial for enhancing competitiveness and raise growth 
potential, and a study by Kolev et al (2013) for the European Investment Bank 
describes a priority list –from the acceleration of reforms to industrial restructuring 
to financial support– to mitigate the current slackness.   
Combining reforms with new investment is necessary to avoid deepening recession 
through a mere wage reduction. Repeated calls for post-EMU reforms paid attention 
to changes in both the labour market so as to raise ULC competitiveness and, at the 
same time, the liberalization of product markets so as to reduce oligopolistic 
structures and induce a higher output. According to Everaets and Schuele (2006) 
traded-goods market reforms alone have immediate positive effects on output, 
wages, and welfare, while labor market reforms alone lead to output gains but cause 
a decline in real wages. The synchronization of labour market and product market 
reforms could smooth the adverse effects on real wages and significantly improve 
external imbalances.  
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4. Are all sins the same? 
Another problem that will be encountered with the implementation of Economic 
Governance is the policy asymmetry shown between the members with excessive 
public and/or external deficits, and those with surpluses. In the first place, it seems 
unreasonable to consider taking policy measures penalizing such macroeconomic 
outcomes that every single country would hail as an achievement. For example, 
external surpluses due to technological innovation, productive investment and the 
containment of labour costs should rather be seen as policy or even moral 
benchmarks for those who neglected such policies in the past. 8   
However solid and persuasive such arguments might have sounded in a single 
economy, they are considerably mitigated if expressed in the context of a monetary 
union where the weaker member-states are by definition excluded from resorting to 
currency devaluation as a means to contain external deficits. In an optimal currency 
union, capital and labour mobility would have had sufficed to catalyze an efficient 
factor allocation but this seldom happens in practice. The first decade of the EMU 
showed that labour mobility was only marginal, while the provisions of free capital 
flows did not prove to affect all member-states in a positive way. As shown by 
Christodoulakis and Sarantides (2016), productive foreign direct investment 
increased in all Euro Area countries after the establishment of EMU, though in a 
highly diverging pattern. The countries in northern Europe were able to attract most 
of the FDI in the form of productive capital, while most of the FDI flown to the 
peripheral economies was routed to the real-estate. As a consequence, the 
competitive edge of the first group was further strengthened, while external deficits 
in the second group were even more deteriorated.  
This finding calls for some feedback mechanism to control excessive accumulation 
of surplus countries, while at the same time helping to improve the deficit countries. 
The most efficient way to carry this out is surplus countries to allow for fiscal ease 
that will be reducing external surpluses through the rise of imports. Besides, this 
restores some symmetry in deficit-containing member-states by raising their exports 
and, thus, mitigating the recessionary effects they face by their own correction.  
                                                          
8 For example, in praising surplus states, Dyson (2014, p 294) attributes their success to the ‘[a]scetic 
culture, frugality, hard work, and discipline’.  
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Similar arguments hold for excessive fiscal surpluses. In the first place, such cases 
are the result of disciplined management and efficient tax collection, hence they 
should provide policy benchmarks for other countries rather than being used as a 
buffer stock to facilitate the redemption of the errant members. Again, the moralistic 
argument is mitigated if considered in the context of a monetary union, where the 
coexistence of surplus and deficit excesses is not sustainable. Sooner or later, the 
deficit country will pay the price by following an austerity program that drives the 
economy into recession or else exit the union. But surplus countries too will feel the 
consequences in both cases and the experience of the recent debt-crises has shown 
that they are more likely to choose sharing the burden of adjustment rather than 
remaining inactive and risk break-outs.  
A compromise is to introduce fiscal discipline at the country level in combination 
with a collective action mechanism in case that excessive fiscal effort is needed. The 
former includes ex ante fiscal limits and ex post austerity measures if budgetary 
targets are violated. To this effect, Annunziata (2010) argues that in order to avoid 
the recession in the future that unavoidably would accompany fiscal consolidation 
measures if limits are trespassed, national governments might well prefer to take 
action in advance. The collective mechanism will have to deal with the downswings 
of the business cycle by using reserves accumulated during the upswing periods, as 
suggested by Dullien and Schwarzer (2011). This mechanism avoids the problem of 
counter-incentives: surplus countries would not be hindered toward pursuing 
competitive policies by seeing that part of their savings will finance the 
irresponsibility of other partners in terms of debt-burden sharing. But in the face of 
a deep recession, some assistance in the errant countries would in fact benefit the 
surplus countries by keeping up aggregate demand and mitigating the transmission 
of the downward effect.  
 
5. An Extended Fiscal Rule  
The most appropriate framework to design fiscal policy and avoid adverse side-
effects is to explicitly recognize the twin pillars of internal and external balance as 
the ultimate goal of macroeconomic policy for either deficit or surplus countries. The 
internal balance requires that the economy is at, or close to, full employment and 
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price stability, while the external one is respected as long as there are not excessive 
deficits or surpluses in the current account transactions with the rest of the world.  
 
The need for keeping the twin balances under control was advocated by Meade 
(1977), before becoming a standard reference in modern textbooks; see, for example, 
Krugman and Obstfeld (2003, Ch. 18). In this respect, an early deficiency of the Euro 
Area was that from all the requirements of the twin balances only price stability was 
formally – and forcefully - addressed in the Treaty. The remaining targets of 
enhancing economic activity, raising employment and controlling the external 
imbalances were left without any specific targeting in the hope that market 
integration and increased factor mobility would accomplish the task.  
Though a number of projects and reform initiatives, such as the Structural Funds, the 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth or the most recent Juncker Investment Fund, were 
designed to speed-up such a process for the members lagging behind, the outcome 
was never satisfactory enough. The reason was that these are open-ended policies, 
in the sense that there is no binding commitment for a specific outcome to be 
achieved within a given period of implementation.  
The history of EMU so far shows that the Eurozone as a whole nearly achieved an 
external balance, though activity remained throughout far from reaching full 
employment. For individual countries, the record is mixed: several southern 
Eurozone economies experienced a combination of high growth and vast external 
deficits, while northern economies enjoyed external surpluses albeit at moderate 
growth rates. A new framework for EGEA should provide policies that enhance the 
internal and external balances at both the individual country level and the Eurozone 
aggregate as briefly sketched below. 
Since the ECB is taking care of price stability, achieving internal balance in EMU 
amounts to keep activity at a level capable to generate close to full employment. 
Deviations from target can be measured by the gap between actual and potential 
output as a percentage of the latter. If variable GAP is positive (negative), the 
economy is working above (below) capacity. External deviations are simply 
measured by the Current Account Balance as percent of GDP, (variable CAB). For 
simplicity, the bliss point is set at GAP=CAB=0, though other combinations of 
desired levels or wider bands can be considered in the same manner.  
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Using these two indicators, fiscal policy is designed into two steps, so as meet a 
sustainability target in the medium run and then allowed to be activated in response 
to deviations from activity or external targets, as follows: 
Step I: Design a fiscal plan 
A fiscal plan {𝑆𝑡
∗} is defined as the time-path of primary surpluses that is required to 
stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio (say variable DY) at a target level DY* in the medium 
term (T) under a baseline scenario for the economy. Formally:   
𝑆𝑡
∗ = {𝑆𝑡 , 𝑡 = 0, … , 𝑇| 𝐷𝑌𝑡 →𝐷𝑌
∗  as 𝑡 → 𝑇}      (1) 
The calculation of the fiscal plan can be carried out by employing optimal control 
methods or by trial-and-error simulations on empirical models until the target is 
satisfied. However, this is left out for future research and only a qualitative 
discussion is included here. Given that fiscal policy thus far is predominantly 
determined so as to confront budgetary imbalances, the plan {𝑆𝑡
∗} can be roughly 
approximated by the current medium-term plans of fiscal consolidations that are 
applied in member-states. 
 
Step II: Fiscal activism 
In case those internal and external balances are kept within the prescribed levels, 
fiscal policy follows the plan with no deviation. But if any of them is in imbalance, 
a component of fiscal policy that takes into account deviations from internal and/or 
external balances is tuned around the plan. The tuning would imply that primary 
surpluses are pro-cyclical with activity, rising during booms and lowering in 
recessions, and counter-cyclical vis-à-vis external balances in order to raise domestic 
demand for imports when in surplus and contain them when it runs an external 
deficit. A simple Taylor-like rule guiding the deviation of primary surpluses from 
the medium-term plan is written as: 
𝑆𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡
∗ = 𝛼 ∙ [𝛽 ∙ 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 − 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑡]     (2) 
In the above expression, (St) denotes the actual primary surplus as percent to GDP, 
parameter (α>0) the degree of fiscal activism, and (β>0) the relative importance of 
internal over external balances.  
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Rule (2) becomes expansionary or contractionary as long as S<S* or S>S* 
respectively: economies with strong growth and large external deficits (i.e. 
CAB<0<βGAP), should clearly adopt measures of fiscal contraction; economies in 
recession and external surpluses (i.e. CAB>0>βGAP) should expand fiscally. The 
other cases depend on the relative size of policy parameters. Control parameter (α>0) 
is set so as to optimally satisfy a chosen policy index, under the constraint that gross 
public deficit is kept lower than the SGP limit of 3% of GDP. 
To get an idea of how fiscal policy would have reacted if such a rule was in place 
prior to the debt crisis, the combinations of historical output gaps and external 
balances of the Euro Area countries are depicted in Fig. 7 for the period 2006-2008. 
Interestingly enough, there was no country in the pre-crisis period that was in 
slackness and at the same time enjoying external surpluses. This can be taken to 
suggest that pre-crisis fiscal policy was lax enough so that Governments could 
exploit it and fight off such a possible outcome.  
The majority of Euro Area countries lie in the southeast quarter of Fig. 7, suggesting 
that a more rigorous fiscal policy should have been adopted at the time. The largest 
consolidation programs should had been applied in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Cyprus and Greece, while milder ones were appropriate for Ireland, Spain, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and Malta. Italy and France experienced a rather low growth and 
marginal imbalances, thus no serious alteration of fiscal policy was necessary.  
It is noteworthy that some surplus countries in the northeast quarter of Fig. 7 did not 
enjoy adequate growth and a more satisfying outcome could have been achieved by 
allowing more fiscal activism. Setting, for example, β=2 to denote that output 
slackness matters twice as much as the external balance, a policy contour is derived 
as shown in Fig. 7. Under this policy weighting, Finland too had to be fiscally more 
cautious, while Germany, Luxemburg and the Netherlands should have been more 
expansionary. Austria and Belgium turned to be just about right. 
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Fig. 7. CAB and Gap for EA19, 2006-2008, in percent.  
Note: Labels are for country acronyms. The borderline contour is drawn for β=2; countries 
below the line are over-expansionary.  Source: Ameco Database 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. CAB and Gap for EA19, 2016, in percent.  
Note: The borderline contour is drawn for β=2; countries above the line are over-
contractionary. Source: Ameco Database (estimates).  
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The fiscal rule can be further explored by examining its implications in the current 
situation. Using data estimates for 2016, Fig. 8 reveals that the majority of Euro Area 
economies now lie in the northwest quarter, suggesting that a more expansionary 
fiscal policy would have resulted to a higher fulfillment of internal and external 
balances. Drawing a similar policy contour for β=2, it is clear that only Latvia, 
Cyprus and Lithuania should now adopt some small fiscal contraction, while all 
others would be better off by expanding fiscally. The largest fiscal expansion should 
be undertaken by Germany and the Netherlands due to high external surpluses, and 
also by Greece due to the extreme slackness of activity.  
The previous analysis shows that, before the crisis, fiscal policy in the Euro Area 
was unwisely expansionary for several economies. Unless the internal and external 
balances are seriously pursued, it risks being unduly contractionary for most of them 
in the post-crisis period. The new component can be either implemented as a 
deviation from the medium term plan or, else, financed by collective action through 
union-wide accumulated surpluses as described by Dullien and Schwarzer (2011) 
and discussed in the previous section. Symmetrically for the case of a surplus 
country, the deviation can be either implemented as an expansion of national 
aggregate demand or, else, saved in the collective facility. 
 
6. Choosing the fiscal mix 
A further issue concerning the implementation of fiscal policy is which specific 
component of primary balances of General Government should be used as the key 
instrument in managing public finances. Three components are considered in turn: 
 Public ordinary expenditure 
 Public capital formation 
 Taxation 
 
Choosing among them entails some differentiation regarding implementation speed, 
effectiveness, as well as social equity and political viability. The following remarks 
on the merits and problems of using each particular component on demand 
management are discussed: 
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Adjusting ordinary expenditure: 
Government expenditures are designed for specific purposes (e.g. defense, health, 
education, social benefits, etc.) and are directed toward certain groups, thus their 
change is bound to have asymmetric effects across the various sectors of society. 
This makes it operationally risky and/or politically difficult to turn these flows of 
expenditure on and off in the interests of general control over aggregate demand and 
the debt burden. The impact differentiation may pose extra political difficulties in 
fine-tuning a downward adjustment of public expenditure as this would result to 
unequally spreading the burden of adjustment. 
 
Public capital formation: 
If public investment programs are curtailed as part of a fiscal correction program, 
the economy will not only experience further recession but competitiveness may also 
weaken and thus prevent a quick return on a growth path. In view of the extensive 
underinvestment currently witnessed in the Euro Area, public capital formation 
should be examined only when a fiscal expansion is considered and not be subjected 
to further cuts. 
Tax adjustment:  
The adjustment of tax rates may include the general rate of income tax, the VAT rate, 
lump-sum taxation, or compulsory national insurance contributions. A change in 
indirect taxation is impacting –though not in a perfectly symmetric way - across all 
sectors of the economy, and this can be considered as a more fair intervention in 
terms of equity. It is accompanied by price rises and these in turn may impact upon 
competitiveness, and the external balance. On the other hand, changes in direct 
taxation cause distortions in factor markets and may seriously affect investment 
activity.  
 
Taking into account the above characteristics, Weale et al (1989) had suggested that 
in order to minimize the adverse effects, a combination of fiscal instruments should 
be chosen with the following criteria: 
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 In public expenditure, mark some categories as flexible and make them 
conditional upon the overall fiscal stance. Examples include performance 
bonuses in the public sector, overtime pay, auxiliary benefits, travelling 
allowances, etc.  
 
 In the tax-revenue side, the Government should adopt a flexible margin on 
VAT, income tax and social security contributions that will vary conditionally 
on the overall fiscal stance. Changes in the VAT rates are more easily accepted 
by the public to serve short-term objectives, while longer-term targets such as 
growth-inducement or social insurance viability are better supported by 
changes in income taxes.  
 
A periodic review (e.g. an annual budget) of expenditure plans which takes account 
of the forward probabilities of a general fiscal expansion or restriction, combined 
with arrangements for frequent and prompt feedback adjustments of certain general 
tax rates, may well be the most satisfactory procedure.  
Cuts in crucial spending components that may be held responsible for affecting 
competitiveness, such as investment spending, innovation and human capital 
upgrading, should be avoided in order to avoid the detrimental effect on future 
potential output. The countries entering a downward spiral should be given priority 
for participating in EU-wide investment schemes and thus assisted in exiting the 
recessionary cycle. Otherwise, they will be forced to rely on labour market 
liberalization policies and/or wage cuts that will further strengthen the recessionary 
spiral rather than suppressing it.  
 
7. Conclusions 
The paper discussed some aspects of policy prevention and correction that are 
designed in the framework of Economic Governance in the Euro Area. Although the 
list of leading indicators of an impending crisis, as well as the composition and 
operation of the corrective policy mix, are still debated, there is an overwhelming 
view of endorsing public debt as the key indicator for assessing the criticality of 
economic developments. The paper argues that a prevention mechanism heavily 
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relying on public indebtedness may miss critical characteristics of a future crisis, 
thus due attention is also required to be put on external imbalances and other 
structural characteristics of the economy.  
With regards to the correction mechanism, a distinction should be drawn according 
to the phase of the business cycle. In an upward cycle, fiscal redress should be the 
key for fiscal stabilization, while the recovery of competitiveness will require a mix 
of wage restraint, labour and product market reforms, and production innovations. 
But in a downward cycle all these measures are likely to accelerate recession and 
should be kept at a minimum or applied in conjunction with investment initiatives 
so as to enhance economic potential and speed-up the exiting from the crisis. The 
symmetric application of adjustment rules for surplus countries will mitigate the 
recessionary effects in the errant economies and thus help the implementation of 
their adjustment programs. 
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